Copy No._____ CONFIDENTIAL

THE POTENTIALS OF WORLD COMMUNISM: THE FAR EAST

PART IV: CHINA

OIR Report No. 4909.5

August 1, 1949

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT: NOTHING IN IT IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A STATEMENT OF U.S. OR DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OR AS A RECOMMENDATION OF ANY GIVEN POLICY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Far East
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
I.	Current Status of the Party	1
II.	The Environment of the Communist Revolution in China	4
	A. The Social Scene	5
	1. The Traditional Society	5
	a. Production and distribution	6
	b. The prevailing outlook	7
	c. The nature of authority	8
	2. Pre-Communist Elements of Change	9
	a. Saturation of China's land frontiers	10
	b. The new foundations for wealth and power	11
	c. The breakdown of group loyalties and the differentiation of new social classes	12
	d. The problem of creating a viable state	12
	e. The emergence of a new outlook	13
	B. The Communist Strategy toward China	14
III.	Prospects for a Reasonably Enduring Communist Regime in China	17
	A. Short-Term Prospects	18
	1. The Problems	18
	2. Communist Assets and Liabilities in Meeting the Problems	21
	B. Long-Term Prospects	24
	1. The Problems	24
	2. Communist Assets and Liabilities in Meeting the Problems	27

APPENDIXES

A.	A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party	29
B.	Biographical Notes on Significant Communists	37

When this study outlives its usefulness
to you, please return it to:

Department of State
Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)
626 State Annex No. 1
Washington, D. C.

THE POTENTIALS OF WORLD COMMUNISM: THE FAR EAST

PART IV: CHINA

I. CURRENT STATUS OF THE PARTY[1]

The Chinese Communist Party now stands within reach of nearly complete military and political control over the area of China proper.[2] This national achievement is viewed by world Communists as second in importance only to the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, for it brings under Communist authority the vast population, land mass, and the historical culture of China. Historically, such an achievement is remarkable for a movement with only thirty years (twenty in extreme adversity) of competition for power in a society accustomed to slow changes over long time periods.

The currently favorable situation of the Communist Party in China is explained by a succession of military victories over the recognized National Government largely post-dating the Japanese surrender in 1945. These victories are the culmination of a policy of revolution that was adopted more than twenty years ago. The most successful elements of this policy were to secure territorial bases and large military forces. A measure of the policy's recent success has been the expansion of Chinese Communist armies from roughly 80,000 men in 1936 to approximately 3,000,000 men today; the concomitant extension of territories under Communist control from a small area of Shensi Province in 1936 to a large part of Manchuria and more than half of China proper today.

The Communist Party of China has not yet assumed the authority of a de jure national government, but prefers temporarily to remain in rebellion against the existing national government, destroying through military action in south and west China the remnants of power still adhering to that tottering regime. Its governmental authority in areas of Communist control or activity is exercised through

---

1. See Appendix A for a brief history of the Chinese Communist Party.
2. The exact nature of the Chinese Communist Party's control of Manchuria is as yet not clear. The extreme northwestern areas are at present beyond its penetration.

varying types of regional or local organization, ranging from the full-fledged "people's governments" of North and Central China, through the "administrative council" of Northeast China (Manchuria), through the amalgamated "border region governments" of Northwest China, to the still purely military regimes in East China and on the army fronts of South China.

Although the Communist underground organizations undoubtedly tried to incite and use students and workers within the Kuomintang areas, guerrilla forces composed of disaffected peasants generally offered more possibilities of diverting Kuomintang strength than did the urban underground.

The leadership of the party is fairly well knit and currently claims to control a mass membership of approximately 3 million persons. The party is directed by a small elite that has been associated through personal contact and common destiny since the party's founding in 1921. As with other Communist Parties, this elite is strongly represented in the three important organs: the inclusive Central Committee of 77 members; its highly selective Presidium, or Politburo, of 12 members; and a Military Council of 14 members. Uniform background and common experience over most of the history of the party render this ruling group fairly homogeneous. Fifty-five out of the seventy-seven men of the Central Committee are from Central China, some twenty-five from Mao Tse-tung's native province of Hunan alone. A majority was both connected with the Kiangsi Soviet (a Chinese Communist agrarian regime that held forth in the rural fastness of Kiangsi and Fukien Provinces during the years 1931-34) and shared the now-legendary difficulties of the "Long March" to Shensi Province following the liquidation of the Kiangsi regime under Nationalist assult in 1934. Of the twelve men on the Politburo, all have been party members for at least twenty-one years, while half have belonged to the party over twenty-five years.

As world Communist leaders go, the members of the Central Committee are not old, averaging 46 years in age. Yet, in view of the average tour of service, they have shown a remarkable ability to survive; this may be explained, in part, by

the absence of general fratricidal purges. Their training in leadership has drawn both on formal education and on experience in the field. In that portion of education that has been formal, the leadership has been especially fortunate, having variously enjoyed the facilities of the foremost Chinese, German, Soviet, and French institutions of learning. At least thirty of the seventy-seven constituents of the Central Committee have studied abroad, and twenty-six have studied or resided for a time in the USSR. That they have not failed in adapting their varied educations to the hard conditions of China is demonstrated graphically by their successes in leading the Chinese peasants, whether into politics or into battle.

Full political control in China will mean that the well-trained elite core operating through the three million accepted party members will have to control several hundred millions of non-Communist Chinese. The formulation of plans for solving the problems involved in such a sudden and vast expansion has been the major preoccupation of the Communist Party during the last year.

As is consonant with the principles of "people's democracy," a form of government that the national government of Communist China may be expected to take, the Communist Party has made known its intention of masking its authoritarian role at this stage behind numerous "front" parties and organizations that will ultimately be represented in a "coalition" regime. These have been in the process of formation or reconstitution since late 1948. The preliminary "Political Consultative Conference," an organic assembly held at Shih-chia-chuang in early 1949, was attended by representatives of a variety of groups -- the Democratic League, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, associations of writers and intellectuals, professional groups, women's organizations, labor and peasant unions, youth and student groups, overseas Chinese, and other elements. Because of the overwhelmingly agrarian character of China and Chinese Communism, the influence of labor is still relatively slight, for example, the All-China Federation of Labor, a Communist organization, numbers only 800,000 persons.

However, Mao Tse-tung, in the following paragraphs from his speech of July 1, 1949, makes it clear that the leadership of even this small working class is considered absolutely essential for the success of the party:

> "The basis of the people's democratic dictatorship is the alliance of the working class, the peasant class, and the urban petty-bourgeois class, and is mainly the alliance of the working class and the peasant class because this class constitutes 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population. It is mainly the strength of these two classes which overthrows imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionary clique. The passing from the new democracy to socialism mainly depends on the alliance of these two classes.
>
> "The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class, because only the working class is most far-sighted, just, unselfish, and richly endowed with revolutionary thoroughness. The history of the entire revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class, the revolution is bound to fail, and with the leadership of the working class, the revolution is victorious.
>
> "In the ear of imperialism, no other class in any country can lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the Chinese national bourgeois class led the revolution many times and failed."[1]

II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN CHINA

The progress of Communism in China to date has been facilitated by a profound social upheaval that began more than a century before the coming of Communism to China. The Communists are the first to acknowledge their debt to this upheaval, which they characterize as a phase in the evolution of "capitalism." That it has unloosed tremendously powerful forces that even the Communists have not adequately analyzed is evidenced in the checkered career of Communism in China. The Chinese Communists' opportunistic seizure of success must be inferred, since there is a wide gap between the theories and plans enunciated by the Communists in advance and the actual developments for which they later take credit. This duality of revolutionary movement in modern China -- the massive but undirected social forces and the Communist attempt to harness these forces in the name of a world ideology -- sets the conditions of analysis, requiring that

1. FBIB, Daily Report, PPP-5, July 5, 1949 (Pei-p'ing, New China News Agency, June 30, 1949).

attention be given both to the social scene in China and to the strategy and tactics devised for it.

A. The Social Scene

The process of change in China is frequently described (for want of a better understanding of Chinese civilization) as one of "Westernization" or "modernization," involving the simultaneous operation of the various forces experienced by the West in its social upheavals from the Renaissance to the Russian Revolution. In respect to the economic and technical changes in China, this description may well be true. However, the other facets of China's pre-Communist revolution -- social, ethical, and political -- exhibit a general decline and an attempted reconstitution of the traditional society of China.

To understand the situation into which Marxist-Leninist ideology has been injected in the period 1921-49, it is necessary to discuss briefly the outstanding individual features of the traditional society and the changes manifest in them during the last century.

1. The Traditional Society. Traditional China, as seen by Western eyes, is a civilization that has been distinguished throughout most of its history by an enormously high ratio of people to available material resources.[1] The ratio is expressed today in an over-all population of more than 400 million beings, concentrated a thousand persons to a square mile of cultivated land and showing a death rate of 30 per thousand; is reflected in the estimate that nearly 80 percent of all the energy produced in China derives from animate as against inanimate sources;[2] appears in the accepted opinion that 80 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture; seems demonstrated by the facts that the average farm averages only 4 acres in size and there is only 0.6 of an acre in crop for each person; is dramatically reiterated in the enforced consumption of seed products instead of animal products, seed products accounting for approximately 90 percent of the calories in the average diet; and is evidenced finally

1. It is currently believed that the population of China in 2 A.D., numbering possibly 50 million people, was concentrated largely in the Yellow River Valley, in densities approaching those of the same area today.
2. In the US, only 30 percent is derived from animate sources.

in the struggle for survival, which is dramatically underlined by the mean of three famines that have plagued each generation of Chinese for more than a thousand years.

This situation derives in large part from social attitudes. Nevertheless, certain agricultural and commercial factors have been basic to these attitudes.

a. Production and distribution. For convenience, "production" can be equated with the output of the land, which accounts for roughly 80 percent of Chinese national income.[1] This output can be very crudely measured in bulk terms: some 50 million tons of rice per year, 22 million tons of wheat, 20 million tons of potatoes, 7 million tons of sorghum, 8 million tons of millet, and 6.5 million tons of corn. Its total size reflects the intensive application of human and animal labor to a geographically large, but per capita small, amount of arable land.[2] Although the technology is generally regarded as "primitive," it compares not unfavorably with that employed in Europe around 1700.

Considerable publicity has been given the subject of land tenure in China, but in fact the proportion of farmers who are tenants in the country as a whole does not compare unfavorably with figures for tenancy in the US.[3]

Tenancy in China is a purely contractual relationship between landlord and peasant in which part of the income or product of the land is paid as rent. This relationship has none of the overtones of feudal "dues" or "services" that distinguished the manorial system in Europe. Often viewed as an onerous burden on the peasantry, tenancy is one of the chief instruments of capital accumulation in China, serving to mobilize the agricultural surplus for its chief beneficiaries. It is therefore no coincidence that tenancy is most common in areas of greatest productivity and market activity -- among the double-cropping rice farmers of South and West China and is least common among the single-cropping farmers in the wheat-millet-sorghum areas of North China.

1. Very roughly estimated at US $50 per capita per annum.
2. About 240 million acres under cultivation.
3. In 1937 in China only 30 percent of the farmers were tenants. Twenty-four percent were part owners, and 46 percent were full owners of the land they cultivated.

Usury is a feature of the traditional society, reflecting the pressing need for capital in an economy where the land is parcellized and the producer completely at the mercy of climate and market. Interest rates on loans, which have generally been obtained from landlords or professional moneylenders, may run as high as 10 percent per month in normal times. Credit is generally required by the peasant for short-term production or consumption purposes, and its cost to him reflects his inability to control the circumstances of his own livelihood in China.

It is occasionally forgotten, in this connection, that the Chinese peasant operates within a complex town economy that had origin in the very beginnings of his society. A surprising portion of total agricultural output enters the market -- which in reality is a series of small and inaccessible local markets -- where its terms of trade are determined with reference to local handicraft or goods manufactured in the coastal areas. The existence of large-scale urban life in historical China is evidence of a marketable surplus from agriculture, and the extent of bureaucracy, military activity, and accumulated wealth indicates the degree to which that surplus has flowed, uncompensated, into non-peasant channels.

Although there have been many political claimants for the fruits of trade in China, a bona fide commercial class was able to evolve there whose enterprises took the accepted forms of "mercantile captialism."[1] However, owing to the historic imposition of political values and controls on commerce, business came to be either a path to political power or the creature of such power. It must thus be emphasized that, while China was no stranger to the institutions of capitalism, it molded them into forms that precluded the development of Western "industrial capitalism."

b. The prevailing outlook. The Chinese have traditionally viewed all things as being in equilibrium, a state not of progress or advance but of constant adjustment to existing forces. This conception, because it emphasizes social stability and relies

1. Sedentary enterprises, generally involving family backing, requiring the projection of risk over a number of months and entailing in some cases the letting-out of work by a factor to numerous cottage industries.

on basic ideas that confute the abstract Western concepts of "progress," "science," and "order," imparts a collaborative rather than competitive flavor and a "satisfied" rather than acquisitive character to Chinese society.

Chinese social institutions and activities reflect these compromising and static attitudes. The Chinese never developed the incentives and abstract intellectual tools of Western science. The authority of the state is restricted by the extent of collaboration in subsidiary patriarchal groups, and such collaboration has been traditionally indispensable to individual survival. Law, as it functions in China, is the personalized practice of equity rather than an impersonal code deriving authority from the state. Chinese religion lacks a highly developed notion of "supernatural order" and thus flourishes primarily as ethics, ceremonial, and ancestor worship. Much innovation has been anathema in the past because it disturbs the human and material equilibrium on which the social system is believed to rest.

There is no doubt that, if traditional Chinese society has failed by Western standards in the major objective of satisfying basic human material needs, it has succeeded admirably in the less measurable objective of maintaining a high level of spontaneous cooperation.

c. The nature of authority. Traditional China never developed a "state" as it is understood in Western parlance, that is, an overlying source of authority and prime focus of loyalty in whose name people might rule themselves or others. Instead, authority -- that is, the ability to gain popular acceptance of policy -- was divided between (1) the patriarchal groups (whose origin was the early peasant-village and whose basis was a status relationship), and (2) the social classes (whose origin was the early cities and who performed specialized functions of an intellectual, military, or economic character).

Among the groups that have served to perpetuate status relationships in modern China, the family, clan, village community, and secret society have predominated. The

family, for example, has continued to perform a variety of functions, including the gaining of subsistence (in both agriculture and commerce), the maintenance of ceremonies (family ancestor worship representing the chief "religion"), police supervision (responsibility for correct behavior by all its members), and intellectual indoctrination (the inculcation of learning, knowledge, and social values). Through kinship relations, each individual in China has been related to most social situations -- excepting those which, through the development of town life, required specialization by function, that is as merchant, scholar, and so on.

It must be recognized that class content (except for the peasantry) was always extremely amorphous. One reason for this was the persistence of group activities, which, as evidenced by the retention of family organization in business and the association of merchants in guilds and secret societies, operated to modify profoundly the ordinarily clear-cut class interest of the scholar official, the merchant, and the artisan.

One consequence of the process was that a dominant bourgeoisie failed to emerge in China. In the West the bourgeoisie became the spokesman for the all-powerful state, the clarifier of the "universalist ethic" of Christianity, and the chief advocate of individualistic specialization, scientific development, and capitalist enterprise. Because Chinese economic and intellectual development did not engender conditions producing a bourgeoisie, China failed to produce either a clear-cut authoritarian state and impersonal ethics or a "non-political" capitalist economy. This implies a failure by Western standards but not by the more intangible standards by which the Chinese has traditionally judged his own society.

2. Pre-Communist Elements of Change. The changes manifested in the traditional society before the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and its victories in 1949 were those engendered in part by the progressive intrusion of Western nations after the sixteenth century and in part by the mounting internal weakness of the society itself. For convenience, the effects of the two developments will be considered

briefly under the following broad headings: (a) saturation of China's land frontiers; (b) the new concept of wealth and power; (c) the breakdown of group loyalties and the differentiation of new social classes; (d) the problem of creating a viable state; and (e) the emergence of a new outlook.

a. Saturation of China's land frontiers. The roughly threefold increase in Chinese population from 1700 to 1911, which occurred independently of Western "imperialism" and the implantation of Western industry, must be regarded as a prime cause of the fall of the Manchu regime in 1911, for this increase, inspired in part by new food crops, resulted in near saturation of China's arable land[1] and the termination of a long-term frontier movement.[2] Its results may possibly be compared with certain economic and social results of the passing of the land frontiers of the US.

It seems evident from studies of early concentrations of population in China that poverty approaching that of today was endemic in traditional China. However, one palliative for such poverty was constantly to be found in migration and resettlement, the large internal and border frontiers serving to draw off surplus population and thus to maintain at bearable levels the evils attendant on overcrowding (such as land shortage, overrenting, famine, and disease). This external solution of the population problem was necessarily terminated during the great increase of population of the Manchu period (1644-1911), made possible by the introduction and rapid expansion of food crops such as sorghum, maize, sweet potatoes, and peanuts throughout arable China. The corollary, that henceforth overpopulation could be ameliorated only by natural and human catastrophes, had profound social implications that were realized in China only during the series of peasants' revolts of the early nineteenth century, culminating in the great T'ai-p'ing rebellion of 1849-65. Even as the West was forcing its technology on China, therefore, the leaders of the Manchu regime were learning of the need for an internal solution of the problems of over-population and poverty, whether or not to the detriment of the ancient system of collaboration.

1. In terms of going technology.
2. Except in Manchuria, where colonization reached its peak in approximately 1929.

b. The new foundations for wealth and power. The ideas and products that freely penetrated China following the Opium War (1839-42) impressed certain of the Chinese leaders with the possibilities of a technical approach not only to improvements in standards of living but also to the betterment of China's position as a world nation. Because industrialization was still far distant, the result was primarily psychological -- that is, no aspiring or ruling political group could ignore the issues of industrial development.

The crystallization of Chinese thought on these issues, following fifty years of enthusiastic experimentation with Western-type industry by Chirese themselves (1860-1910) and an equal period of Western inspired developments in the foreign extra-territorial areas, was necessarily tinged with disillusionment. The modern-type development in many cases accentuated the basic distresses of the traditional society instead of solving them. The growth of the large coastal cities, for example, encouraged the complete dispossession of independent peasants in the immediate hinterland and the exaggerated growth of overrenting and absentee landlordism. In the same process hereditary tenants likewise lost the surface rights originally held in the soil. Machine-made products eventually came to penetrate the farthest hinterland, Yunnan and Szechuan, completely undercutting the cottage industries that had once supplemented peasant incomes. Evils of "putting-out" (an eighteenth-century phenomenon in the West) likewise spread through certain areas where home weaving was practiced. In addition, urban unemployment appeared, and the tea, silk, and tung-oil farmers became dependent on world markets.

The thinking of Sun Yat-sen, midway in the process, set a pattern that still prevails. It postulated that in China's case a fairly large-scale industry -- to be achieved by grand "modern" improvements in transportation, farming, power supply, and production and distribution in general -- would be ideal. Producers' and capital goods industries (iron, steel, cement, electric power, rubber, machine tools, general industrial equipment, etc.) were to be financed and operated by the state. Consumers'

goods industries (textiles, refrigerators, automobiles, etc.) were to be privately financed and operated. "State capitalism," on traditional lines, was thus to be the formal organization of the Chinese effort to end poverty and gain national autonomy and was to be accompanied by a moderate social revolution, guaranteeing "equality" of ownership of land.

c. The breakdown of group loyalties and the differentiation of new social classes. With the destruction of the traditional groups will disappear a structure of authority that made life in China relatively stable. The phenomena of family breakdown, for example, are readily cataloged: new loyalty to the nation, new opportunities for employment, new status of women, decline in the joint family, decline in size of the family, restriction in authority of the father, and gradual termination of arranged marriages. The course by which a viable substitute is to be achieved -- and this may not necessarily be a modern state -- is not so easily blueprinted.

Temporarily, at least, the process appears to lead toward more clear-cut differentiation of the social classes and the emergence of new classes. The reconstitution of the amorphous former classes has proceeded -- with the old scholar class in rapid eclipse, an industrial working class making an appearance, and a new class of technicians, generally lacking the traditional aversion to manual labor, in the process of creation.

d. The problem of creating a viable state. The revolution of 1911 marked the formal dissolution of the old dynastic regime, although many vestiges of that regime were to be carried over into the government of the Republic in the form of the old type of bureaucratic administration (based on the scholar-gentry and pao-chia), lip service to the supremacy of scholarship (as shown in the creation of the Control and Examination Yuan), and maintenance of authority in the old provincial regimes (as shown by the power acceded to regional political and military leaders). The concessions subsequently made to parliamentary government were thus rather quickly shown to have little connection with the prevailing state of affairs in China.

Westerners generally assumed that a theory of jurisprudence and a concept of authority would ultimately develop in China, this affording the legal basis for a "state." Such an assumption did not become a fact. The so-called political parties of China derive their mandate of authority as broadly representative instruments of special social groups and speak only for minorities. As implied before, the authority of the modern political movements in China still lacks, in the absence of a clear-cut stratification of classes, an established social base.

e. The emergence of a new outlook. In a study of pre-Communist or non-Communist change in China, the transformation in outlook should theoretically supply the major clue to the direction of change.

Straws in the wind are that some of the articulate Chinese of the Nationalist Government recognize the pitfalls of nepotism and have admitted a slowly changing outlook on manual labor by the intellectuals, acknowledged the need for some reform in education, taken note of a growing nationalism, accepted some of the theories of sovereignty, and paid at least lip service to the principles of formal law. In the more enduring fields, however, such as the development of new disciplines, reform of language, and technological invention, the indications of change are still few. The "renaissance" associated with the name of Hu Shih (which emphasized a popular literary style, Western logic, and mass education) did little to produce new forms, and the hope voiced by Sun Yat-sen for an adaptation of Western outlook to Chinese tradition appears, on the eve of Chinese Communist success, to remain still a hope.

Without the necessary subsidiary developments it has thus been impossible for China to produce a native "ideology,"[1] whether that be viewed as class doctrine, the intellectual counterpart of a given body of institutions, or the orientation of social progress. Efforts toward change in China have thus lacked the direction that modern ideologies impart. One intellectual change, however, has given direction to all other changes, namely, the appearance of a willingness to compromise the

1. Not to be confused with tradition, which in China has an intellectual atmosphere dominant in the ideas of Confucius.

traditionally dominant social objective -- achievement of harmony, cooperative adjustment, or balance -- with the once subordinate objective of betterment of the material conditions of life.

B. The Communist Strategy Toward China

Communism in China, according to the Communist theorists, is a process of social evolution expressed in the rise and decline of "capitalism," a process that begins with the disintegration of "feudalism" and will ultimately end in the creation of "Communism." This process is regarded as being in its early stages in China, where a traditional society described as "feudal" has been brought within the influence of capitalism as a result of the progressive invasion of China by Western nations since the early nineteenth century. The consequent transformation has progressed to a point at which Chinese society is now characterized by the Communists as "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial."

It is essential to note at the outset that this term, "feudalism," as used by the Communists with regard to China, describes phenomena that are different from those of "feudal" Europe. By the term as applied to Europe Marxists understand a system of landholding in fee tail, under which "lords" granted land to "serfs" in "precarious" tenure, in return for certain labor services. The term with regard to Europe also refers to the whole feudal-manorial social organization of Europe that was evolved through the dispossession of an early land-sharing peasantry by a military class. By the term as applied to China, Marxists understand a system of landholding in fee simple, characterized chiefly by the contractual and non-obligation relation of "rentier" and "tenant." In addition, the term in China describes a gentry-scholar system created through the extension of landlord holdings of property once owned privately by peasants. The dissolution of "feudal" society in China thus involves, in Communist eyes, certain radically different consequences from those encountered in medieval Europe.

A further difference characterizes the Chinese revolution, according to

Marxist-Leninist theory. During the evolution of capitalism in the early European industrial countries, the rising bourgeoisie eventually extended its interests beyond national borders, initiating the process of "imperialism" by which China (and the rest of Asia) was first reduced to "colonial" status. The latter process is seen by Marxists-Leninists to have had two consequences in China: first, the gradual merger of interest of feudal gentry and international bourgeoisie (for the purpose of maintaining China in feudal and subject status) and, second, the rise of an indigenous capitalism, which gave birth both to a progressive and independence-seeking native bourgeoisie and to a revolutionary proletariat.

In terms of actual periods of history, the Communist consider that from 1842[1] to 1921 China was in the "orbit" of the "bourgeois world revolution" and from 1921 to 1949 within the "orbit" of the "socialist world revolution," which is marked by the founding of the various national Communist Parties following the Bolshevik victory in Russia. It may well be, in addition, that 1949, the year of the major Communist victories in China, will be considered to mark the termination of the era of "colonialism" in China, although Communist doctrine fails to make the terms of "colonial" independence clear. This lack of clarity is explained by the separation of the historical process into two major phases, that of "new democracy" and that of "socialism," significant refinements by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung of Lenin's theory of "colonial revolution."[2] Through these phases, enunciated by Communist doctrine, the rise and dissolution of capitalism in China are expected, under Communist direction, to be considerably dovetailed and compressed.

During the current phase of their "new democracy," the Communists view themselves as moving toward power and socialism through judicious employment of the progressive forces of capitalism. This process entails the encouragement of an anti-foreign

1. The date of the Treaty of Nanking, which terminated the "Opium War" and opened China to foreign influences.
2. See Stalin, The International Situation, August 1927, and Mao Tse-tung, New Democracy, 1940.

and thoroughly supervised entrepreneurial class, of privately financed sectors of economic development, and of the political merger of the various revolutionary classes under Communist direction for purposes of government. Lacking a numerous proletariat, owing to the insufficient development of industry, the party must base its present power on the peasants, which in the "feudal" agrarian setting of China still await the liberation brought by early capitalism in the European states.

Since nationalism and cooperation with the progressive bourgeoisie are given greater emphasis under the Communist theory of "colonial revolution" than under the theories of revolution applying to industrial areas, a special relation has arisen between the Communist Parties in colonial areas and the Communist Party of the USSR. The colonial parties are allowed somewhat greater independence of action than is usually associated with the Soviet-led world movement. Although this may be viewed as a relatively recent and tactical development, it reflects the underlying notion that the long and difficult process of achieving socialism in China and the Far East entails the release of those energies engendered by early capitalism and early nationalism and consequently requires taking the risk of cooperation with native movements that may prove ultimately dangerous to Communist advance.

The above theory entails six assumptions by the Communists with regard to China. The first is that an international dogma can, even with major concessions to the national situation, describe the course of development in China and offer means for its control. A second is that the problem of change in China is directed against the material environment and therefore requires immediate attention to economic problems. A third assumption is that such change is to be effected through the development of Western-style industry. A fourth is that a neat stratification of Chinese society has been and is possible and that such stratification holds promise of clear-cut class conflict from which a single and still virtually non-existent class, the proletariat, will emerge triumphant. A further assumption, the fifth, is that the Communists can avail themselves of the productive forces of capitalism and maintain

firm control of them. The last and integrating assumption is that the process by which a "feudal" society can be transformed into a "socialist" one can be enormously compressed, requiring only a fraction of the several hundred years taken in the West.

Obviously, without these assumptions Chinese Communism would be a far more pessimistic movement than it is. At times in its history -- for example, after the native bourgeois, Kuomintang "treachery" of 1927 -- the party has had occasion to review these assumptions in some detail. Each time, however, it seems to have found them satisfactory, and from them has projected the developments by which a "contemporary" of late Western medieval society will within a reasonable time be converted into a socialized industrial state.

III. PROSPECTS FOR A REASONABLY ENDURING COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA

Among the various criteria of Chinese Communist potentials suggested by the foregoing discussion, that of Communist capacity to maintain an enduring regime in China appears most pertinent to this stage of their progress. The Chinese Communist Party has announced that it expects sometime in 1949 or 1950 to establish a national administration based on exclusive political and military control of most of China. Pursuant to general strategy, the party has apparently committed that administration to the attainment of two fairly enduring goals; the more immediate goal, creation of the conditions for shifting Communist power from a rural, peasant base to an urban, largely working class base; and the more distant goal, expansion of the urban working class into the chief instrument of Communist policy in China. In the course of attaining these respective goals in China, the new administration is expected to encounter major problems that may test its ability to remain in power.

The assumption of any specific rate of progress toward the goals must, in view of constant revisions in the Communist schedule, be entirely arbitrary. However, for purposes of analysis, "short-term" prospects are taken to cover roughly the next ten years (1950-60) and "long-term" prospects are taken to refer to an indefinite period beyond 1960.

A. Short-Term Prospects

Although the Chinese Communists at present espouse an apparently "gradualist" program, their regime may eventually encounter sufficient peasant resistance to threaten its authority. In the short term, however, the regime should be able to handle such a threat.

1. The Problems. The assumption of peasant resistance rests on the analysis of a chain of problems that are expected to confront immediate Chinese Communist efforts to "urbanize" their movement in China. The acknowledged conditions for eventual Communist "independence" from the land and from "foreign interference" are the restoration and development of the modern industrial plant now to be found in the coastal cities and Manchuria. Through the development of modern industry, several important requirements are to be fulfilled: that of creating an urban proletariat, that of guaranteeing national autonomy, and that of providing the economic wherewithal for ultimate Communism.

The apparent decision of the Communists to concentrate most of their available energies on modern industry implies a harder choice in China than would superficially appear. China still has not made the basic improvements in agriculture, transportation, and marketing that helped lay the foundations for modern industry in Europe during the period 1500-1700. Agriculture, for example, is still encumbered by land-use patterns outmoded in much of Europe by the nineteenth century. Surpluses of agricultural goods that might be converted to profitable investment remain inaccessible for want of efficient transportation. Although such conditions invite attention to intensive improvement of the agrarian sector of the economy, the Communist apparently plan such improvement only as it directly aids the development of modern industry. Accordingly, the rural economy will apparently be permitted to advance only at the dictate of urban industry, except where private peasant initiative rules otherwise.

Granting that available investment capital will be channeled into industry, what terms will govern its mobilization? The terms appear very much the same,

regardless of the time period covered. The early saturation of China's arable land with population deprived the Chinese of the investment "fat" associated with the sparse population and large supplies of unused or underutilized land found in the Western countries on the eve of their industrial development. The margins in China between average rural living standards and subsistence are now so small as to set two stringent conditions on capital mobilization. The first is that capital for industry shall be derived largely from the savings of existing industrial enterprises and from the savings of semi-commercialized agriculture in areas under Communist control. The second is that population growth must be rigidly controlled.

If, as is entirely possible, population threatens to increase more rapidly than the national income, even the small rate of investment of which China is now capable could be maintained only by the imposition of controls on consumption. Obviously, the Chinese peasantry would, of all sectors of the populace, be most seriously affected by this dictum, and would be subjected to measures that could foreseeably extend all the way from increased taxes and rents, through a managed shift in the terms of trade for agricultural goods, to a program of modified collectivization of the land.

Few of the many economic and political ramifications of such controls require discussion here. It seems sufficient to say that to convert reduced peasant consumption into productive industrial investment would entail the immediate encouragement and control of export crops (such as soybeans and peanuts); the conversion of these crops into foreign exchange via foreign trade; and the purchase of capital goods with this exchange. Because the compulsion to trade would strongly influence the foreign policy of the new regime, its power to drive a hard diplomatic bargain with Japan or the North Atlantic powers might accordingly be reduced.

But the primary problem engendered in the short run is expected to be internal. To impose greatly increased levies on the peasantry now would be to repudiate abruptly the economic policies with which the Communists have been associated in the minds of

the peasants for twenty years. Discontent might well assume such proportions that it would in time threaten the authority of the new regime.

For this authority will continue to rest, in the short term, on a Communist-run coalition in which peasant support will remain temporarily paramount. Communist authority is only now in the process of consolidation and will presumably require continued peasant support in the many political problems that will survive the civil war -- for example, the reorganization of local government. Meanwhile, even as the Communists invoke peasant support, they must begin to dispense with the peasantry as the main pillar of their movement, using reduced peasant income as the means by which to build the proletariat. Their narrow-line policy must therefore be to avoid alienating the peasantry while at the same time cultivating the support of the urban workers.

Peasant resistance, if it should appear in China, would take the progressive forms of hoarding, passive revolt, the liquidation of tax collectors, banditry, and open insurrection. There is no reason to assume that Communist policies will push the peasants to the last contingency, but the first four appear to be completely possible.

That Communist policy will not be entirely under Chinese direction will constitute the final problem in the period immediately following conclusion of the civil war. Actually the formula for easing the peasantry out of effective power is that worked out in detail in satellite Europe and, as employed in the earlier phases of European "people's democracy," appears a moderate one. However, there are two potential inherent difficulties in its application to China: first, that the Chinese Communists may be temporarily forced to abandon their plans for expansion of industry and building of the proletariat in favor of certain basic improvements in agriculture and transportation; second, that, as a consequence of Soviet fear of the phenomena of "Titoism,"[1] the Chinese will be required to speed up the liquidation of peasant influence in their movement.

1. Including laxness in urbanization, undue dependence on the peasantry, overly intimate alliance with the middle classes, and independent conceptions of the proper pace of economic development.

The Chinese Communists may therefore be trapped between a demanding Soviet master and an intractable national situation. Much, accordingly, depends on the "official line" on China during this time. Will it permit flexibility in the approach to the problems of economic development? Can it sanction a program that may grant short-term concessions to the peasantry?

2. Communist Assets and Liabilities in Meeting the Problems. Popular good will will be one of the chief assets of the new Communist government of China on its accession to power. Improvement of living standards and consolidation of national autonomy, both of which are greatly desired by the masses of China, have been promised to the people by the Chinese Communist Party. Provided that certain of the immediate hardships of an industrial program, such as reduced peasant income, do not at once sour the peasant outlook, there is a possibility that the Communists can convert the released national energy generated by this good will into important economic and social gains. A partial flexibility of plan, stimulation of membership in an expanding movement in the Far East, and effective propaganda backed up by the promise of force appear, with some drawbacks, to be the chief assets of the Chinese Communists in maintaining that good will and consequently a stable regime on a short-run basis.

The general program of the Chinese Communists in this phase is that of "people's democracy" in a colonial country, which permits a greater degree of flexibility of action for China than for the European Soviet satellites. The program appears to call for half-public, half-private development of the economy; enlistment of the specialized help of non-Communist technicians, intellectuals, and bureaucrats in running the regime; encouragement of trade with capitalist countries; and maintenance of a "front" with various non-Communist groups. Some doubt now exists, of course, that the Chinese will be permitted to remain long in this "colonial" stage of "people's democracy," although Soviet sanction was given as recently as December 14, 1948. This doubt arises from a significant Soviet broadcast of January 24, 1949 to China, citing the need to move directly toward heavy industry and creation of a large proletariat. In practice, the program so far appears moderate.

Given the general premise that some form of "people's democracy" will continue to meet Soviet approval throughout the short term, the Chinese Communists should face no serious threat of heresy toward the Communist movement. The flexibility inherent in the program of the people's democracy is sufficient to permit the Chinese Communists to adjust their activities to the objective situation constantly without undue danger of deviation from a world Communist line. True, Soviet admonitions to speed up the process of liquidating the "new democracy" could seriously prejudice the new regime with the Chinese peasants. However, should the accelerated program be adopted, sufficient controls apparently exist to prevent discontent from threatening the stability of the regime immediately.

The possibility of a schism between the Chinese Communist leaders and the Kremlin over any lesser points must be generally discounted in the short term. A Chinese Communist malcontent has portrayed Soviet activities in Manchuria as thinly veiled "imperialism," a portrayal eliciting formal party censure.[1] Again, covert Soviet penetration of Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia may have offended the sensibilities of nationalistic Chinese Communist Party members. For the time being, however, the USSR appears to be making serious efforts to avoid a repetition of the Tito affair in China, and the Chinese Communists appear to have as yet little serious reason for a similar break.

Should Soviet sins of omission or commission so compromise the position of the Chinese Communist Party that it feels obliged to attempt secession, the chances of its success would be about as great as were those of the Yugoslav party in mid-1948. The Chinese party has now succeeded in consolidating control under a nationalist leadership. The party is composed largely of members with experience only under the present leadership, which is characterized by long continuity in office and comparative insularity of view. The party has achieved success largely in spite of Soviet help

1. The Manchurian writer Hsiao Chun, in August 1948 and again in June 1949. T-1252, Nanking, June 9, 1949, UNCLASSIFIED.

and largely by means of its own military efforts, which have resulted in the creation of a large independent army. These assets will be important only if the Chinese Communist Party has occasion to sever its membership with the Soviet-led world movement, an occasion which, for the time being, does not appear to exist.

Participation in an expanding ideological movement in which China can assume the position of teacher for the other countries of the Far East will salve the injured cultural pride of the Chinese. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has been even more vocal than the Kuomintang in expressing its desire to see the end of colonial rule by the metropolitan powers of Europe in the other East Asiatic countries. Each country bordering or near China that is recruited to the ranks of Communism will reduce the future possibilities of dissenting movements within China.

Propaganda that concentrates on a new productive "middle peasantry," in whose interest the collectivation and the eventual mechanization of the land are to be undertaken, indicates that the peasants are not to be soon alienated. The now standard political technique of the people's democracies of Europe; e.g., fragmentation of the whole left-wing movement into small functional units (students, petty and enlightened bourgeoisie, labor units, women's groups, intellectual groups, and upper, middle, and poor peasants), with no one unit capable of engendering a political opposition, has already begun. This practice does not seem strange to Chinese, since group politics has always been more meaningful than class or party politics in China.

Should the Chinese Communist Party fail in its dual objective of destroying peasant power (on which it rode to victory) by a relentless fragmentation and liquidation[1] while gradually replacing the peasant base with that of the urban working classes, it

1. The separation of the peasants into upper, middle, and poor peasants is the major line along which the fragmentation has already begun. By setting the poor peasants against the upper peasants, while encouraging and flattering the middle peasants, the Communists succeed in destroying the upper peasants. The next step is to create grades within the middle peasants, so that, when the usefulness of the middle peasant is over, that group can also be destroyed. And so on down.

can in any event employ the threat of violence toward any dissenters. The well-trained Communist army, which stands today at 3 million men, can be used to maintain order and repress incipient movements. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party, like all Communist Parties, has at its command a secret police force trained in the methods of the notorious Soviet secret police.

The issue is not likely to come to violence within the short-term period if a moderate program can be maintained. Party propaganda can draw upon the ample supply of nationalistic issues to persuade doubters to stay within the designated ideological lines. The desire for action that is manifest even in the jaded Chinese urban-dwellers after the long disillusioned inactivity of the Kuomintang period can probably be sustained for some time to come. As in Japan, intellectual ideals can for a time be subverted to "patriotic" ends and the peasants can be harnessed under progressively more onerous controls.

B. Long-Term Prospects

The chief threat to the long-term stability of the Communist regime is the possibility that the regime will not be capable of creating a "state," that is, in Communist parlance, a highly centralized authority representing largely the interest of an urban working class. It is possible, instead, that government in Communist China will be frozen in the form of the "people's democracy," a form embodying important concessions to the decentralized, patriarchal, and relatively unstratified character of present Chinese society. In this event, the Chinese Communists will face a major dilemma: whether to accede to the apparent dictates of Chinese society and risk modification of Communist doctrine or whether to accede to Communist doctrine and risk the advent of a rival domestic claimant for power.

1. The problems. Chinese society may never, or only very gradually, become a modern "urban" society as that term is understood in the West, that is, a society at least 30-40 percent of whose population lives in cities. Given the existing magnitude of rural population (90 percent) and the described limitations on industrial growth,

China may remain for generations a nation composed largely of peasants, peasants living possibly under better conditions than today but still retaining many of the attributes of their ancient patriarchal society.

Beyond the threats of further population growth lie all the intangibles that have hitherto discouraged the industrial development of China: group life, compromising outlook, and so on. The fact that Chinese workers do not respond to wage incentives as Western workers do is generally cited as one of the "intangibles" hindering the growth of industry. Others that may also be mentioned are the prevalence of family organization in business, the continued strength of the guilds, the absence of Western corporate forms, and the general lack of Western economic motives. Although "urbanization" is generally recommended as a cure for these "ills," the "ills" themselves may well effectively preclude the metamorphosis of China into an "urban" society.

Without substantial further urbanization, China is likely to remain in the relatively unstratified state prevailing today. The difficulties already experienced by the Communists in differentiating the various "classes" of the Chinese cities -- intellectuals, entrepreneurs, petty merchants and traders, technicians, and so on -- will presumably continue. Group motivations may remain dominant, causing the interests of various strata to overlap. Furthermore, the industrial labor force hardly promises to become the social instrument envisaged, for it is currently only a little better than 1 percent of the population of 450 million people.

It is thus entirely possible that conditions in China might require the retention of the merger of interest embodied in the "people's democracy." Such a merger is a typical feature of government in China and appeared in the national regime of the Kuomintang in the form of an alliance of intellectual and political cliques, secret societies, guilds, and regional organs. While perhaps not ministering to the same political congregation as this, the Communist regime might be forced, under the described conditions, to continue as the mouthpiece of a variety of social groups. Should it fail to do so and instead insist on the gradual liquidation of all political groups except the working class, the prospects are that popular resentment would give

birth to a competitive political movement, whose chief weapon would be passive popular resistance to the Communist regime.

The Communist government might have to continue to represent a variety of political forces even if Chinese society were stratified further. Urban development is sure to create a vociferous middle class (as well as a proletariat) under the conditions envisioned. Such an eventuality as this is foreseen in Mao Tse-tung's New Democracy, which predicates the release of strong middle-class energies in the formation of a new China, but under firm Communist supervision. "People's democracy," in fact, must assure both the release and the control of such energies. Whether the middle classes, once created, can be readily reduced to political silence in the environment of China remains for Chinese history to show.

In the final analysis, most long-term problems of social change in China are problems in the reorientation of outlook. Whether China will develop Western disciplines, a tradition of technical invention, Western-type concepts of state and law, and acquisitive tendencies is not an academic question. European Communism accepts such phenomena as part of the basic fabric of capitalist society. The belief that China will not automatically develop them is evidenced by the following quotation from New Democracy, which suggests that Chinese society will never be wholly at one with that of the West:

> "China should absorb on a great scale the progressive culture of foreign countries. This refers not only to the proletarian and progressive democratic culture, but also the classical culture of foreign countries, that is useful to us; for instance, the cultural heritage of the capitalist countries in their earlier period of growth. However, we should in no way blindly accept everything foreign without criticism but should deal with it just as in metabolism; we first chew our food, then finally our system separates it into two portions, the one that is to be absorbed to nourish us and the other which is to be thrown out.
>
> "The thesis of 'wholesome westernization' is a mistaken viewpoint. To import things foreign has done China much harm. The same attitude is necessary for the Chinese Communists in the application of Marxism to China. Marxism should not be applied subjectively and dogmatically. Such Marxism is useless. The point is to grasp the general truths of Marxism and apply them to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, i.e., to first achieve the Sinonization of Marxism; subjective and dogmatic Marxism is to caricature Marxism and the

Chinese revolution. For Marxists of this type there is no place in the revolutionary camp. Chinese culture must have its own form, that is, a national form. A national form and a new democratic content -- this is our new culture of today."[1]

2. Communist Assets and Liabilities in Meeting the Problems. In dealing with the above problems the Chinese Communists possess no major assets except time and will. None of the above problems is insoluble given sufficient time and will, and the Chinese Communists have until recently given evidence of having an abundance of both. The will has not abated, but numerous developments, including the recent industrial program, imply that the leadership now believes that time is running shorter.

For this, the European policies of the USSR must take the ultimate blame. The Tito schism and the subsequent Soviet notice to the Communist parties of Eastern Europe that the phase of "people's democracy" must be quickly terminated have both had their repercussions in China. For, although possibly exempted from most of the explicit obligations of the European satellites, the "colonial" Chinese now perceive the strictly temporal character of the phase they now are entering. There is considerable irony in this. "People's democracy" is the political derivative of the phase of "new democracy" first set forth by Mao Tse-tung in 1940 as the foreshortened Communist equivalent of the era of capitalism in China. Yet Mao clearly had no notion then of compressing the latter era as it is being compressed today in Europe. "We should point out," he wrote, "that the period over which the first step [new democracy] will extend will be a considerably long one."

The current compulsion on the Chinese to plan beyond the era of quasi-capitalism and quasi-democracy is today their chief long-term liability and does violence to former concepts of the course of the Chinese revolution. Actually, the day of "proletarian" dominance cannot be foreseen in China, although the Communists must plan for it now. Much of Chinese society still remains by Chinese Communist standards in a "semi-feudal" state and incapable of urban development. Progress for the Chinese

1. Mao Tse-tung, New Democracy, as cited in report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III c, "Communism in China," p. 90.

Communists means not to push industrial expansion at the expense of agricultural development but rather at first to promote such industries as will serve to improve agriculture, thus altering the rural balance of political power. The corollary, of course, is that more power, not less, should be granted to the peasantry and that less weight, not more, should be given to the promotion of the Chinese urban working class.

The cost of the eventual application to China of the Soviet policy currently being applied in the European satellites is difficult to assess. Inasmuch as the Chinese will hardly be permitted to compromise a basic tenet of Communist doctrine (e.g., to move toward a one-class political system), the cost may well be the sacrifice of much of the party's real political strength in China -- unless, of course, the party chooses to utilize the continuing assets of independent strength vis-à-vis the USSR to sever its membership with the Soviet-led movement and to seek to create a schismatic Communist movement in East Asia.

APPENDIX A

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

I. ORIGINS

The Chinese Communist movement originated in the societies formed by intellectuals and students in the aftermath of World War I. The successful revolution engineered by Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 had a profound impact on these Chinese, who saw in Marxist-Leninist doctrine a solution to the ills that had beset Chinese society. This interest was reciprocated by the newly formed Communist International, which soon made contact with these dissident elements in China. By July 1921, this contact had resulted in the successful formation of a Communist Party of China, established by a group of twelve men, including Mao Tse-tung. About this time, too, Chinese Communists organized a labor "Secretariat," which was successful in leading Chinese workers in political and economic struggles in 1922 23. In 1921 and 1922, branches of the Chinese Communist Party were formed among Chinese studying in France, Germany, and Russia. Chou En-lai in France and Chu Te in Germany were among those who joined the party at this time. Chinese Communist activities were confined primarily to the conversion of students and workers and were generally overshadowed by the halting, but internationally more prominent, progress of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. Although its efforts were concentrated in a few urban centers, the party was accepted into the world Communist fold shortly after its founding.

The Comintern also directed its attention toward the Kuomintang in the conviction that Sun Yat-sen's group would prove to be the temporarily useful "bourgeois" ally featured in Lenin's writings on "colonial revolution." The Sun-Joffe understanding of January 26, 1923 and the arrival of Borodin at Canton in the autumn of 1923 as Soviet adviser to the Kuomintang laid the foundations for entry of the Communists into the Kuomintang.

II. COLLABORATION WITH THE "NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE" (JANUARY 1924 TO JULY 1927)

The admission of Communists into the Kuomintang, approved at the first national congress of Sun's party in January 1924, permitted the full flourishing of Communist-

Kuomintang collaboration. The Chinese Communists' strategy was to gain vantage points in the Kuomintang and its armies and ultimately to assume power. "Agitation" was the crux of Communist policy in this period; that is, emphasis on the social and economic "education" of the masses and on their organization for political action. While superintending Chinese Communist execution of the Comintern's directives, Borodin whipped the Kuomintang into a more effective organization with revolutionary appeal. In so doing, he enhanced the authority and prestige of the Communists within the, organization. His task was eased by the occurence of incidents in May and June 1925 at Shanghai and Canton that aroused Chinese national consciousness to the plane of revolutionary action. So successful was Borodin that, six months after the mollifying influence of Sun had been removed by his death in March 1925, the left wing of the Kuomintang had clearly gained the ascendancy.

This growth of Communist strength contributed to internal friction between the component elements of the Kuomintang. The Communists were demarcated from both the right and left wings of the Kuomintang. The right wing sought national unification and freedom from extraterritoriality. The left wing favored internal social and economic reforms not revolution. In March 1926, the divisions were sharpened as a result of an anti Communist coup on the part of Chiang K'ai-shek.

At the same time, a schism had developed within the Russian Party and the Comintern over the desirability of continuing the alliance with the Kuomintang. Actually, Communist policy in China had become part of the deeper struggle for power that was being waged within the USSR and the world Communist movement. The preference of the dominant Stalin faction[1] was for maintaining the alliance with the Kuomintang. This fact, coupled with the Kuomintang's own reluctance to rid itself too quickly of

1. The reasoning of Stalin's faction was that the peasants and workers were not mentally prepared to accept a sudden break with the Kuomintang. Chiang's "betrayal" of the revolution had not become sufficiently clear to them, and therefore it would be folly for the "vanguard" to "break away from the masses."

its activist Communist allies, maintained the tenuous union between the two forces. The right wing of the Kuomintang split irrevocably from the Communists after a violent three day purge of the previously indispensable labor unionists in Shanghai in April 1927 by Chiang K'ai-shek. Meanwhile, the Wuhan government, which had been established in November 1926 by the Kuomintang left wing majority, had become increasingly aware of a Communist desire to depart from the original conditions of collaboration contained in the Sun Joffe memorandum. Comintern agent Roy's ill-advised disclosure of Comintern plans for the seizure of power in the Kuomintang to Wang Ching-wei in June 1927 crystallized the fears of the Kuomintang left wing, and on July 15, 1927 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Hankow expelled the Communists from the party.

III. DEFEAT AND RENAISSANCE (JULY 1927 TO DECEMBER 1936)

These events produced a crisis in the Chinese Communist Party and in the Comintern. The Stalin faction made haste to disown the fruits of its policy. The intellectual Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, was banished from his post on August 7, 1927 and made the scapegoat for the failure on the grounds that he had valued collaboration with the "bourgeoisie" too highly and for too long a time. In Moscow, the Comintern's representatives back from China bent the knee to the Kremlin and also berated themselves for having underestimated the revolutionary temper of the workers and peasants and for having overvalued and prolonged cooperation with the Kuomintang.

The policy of collaboration with the Kuomintang was replaced by a policy of uncompromising revolutionary hostility. The remaining forces of the Chinese Communist Party were committed in desperate attempts to establish "Soviets" in China in line with the Comintern beliefs in the receptivity of the workers and peasants for a revolutionary policy after the "treachery" of Chiang K'ai-shek. The Kuomintang pursued a relentless policy of hunting down the proponents of this new line. The decimated cadres of the Communist Party had to flee for their lives from the urban areas in which they had but shortly before been a significant political force and take refuge in the hinterland.

In the rural areas in which the shattered remnants of the Communist forces exercised a large measure of control, the defeated Communists and Communist troops established new "Soviets." Mao Tse-tung established the first of these rural "Soviets" at Tsalin on the Hunan border in November 1927; Chu Te joined him there in May of the following year. Elsewhere, other "soviets" were created.

Meanwhile, the Comintern, at its Sixth World Congress in 1928, underwrote the policy that was of such disastrous moment to the Chinese Communists. They confirmed the leadership of Li Li-san (Ch'en's successor as party leader) and underscored the continued "revolutionary situation" that presented itself in China. The affirmed party line included the seizure of power in urban centers through attack by local peasant forces under Communist leadership. Presumably these attacks were to be supplemented by the action of the urban masses, who would welcome the Communist liberators.

In January 1929, the forces of Mao and Chu, joined by others, began to move into southern and northern Kiangsi, where, by February 1930, they had occupied sufficient territory to enable them to establish a Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. The new Communist line was put to the test with an attack on Changsha during July and August 1930. The attack ended in complete failure. Communist military strength outside the city and labor support within was insufficient to overcome the well-fortified garrisons of the Kuomintang troops. Li Li-san paid for his mistakes by relinquishing formal leadership of the party in January 1931 and retired to Moscow.

The beaten Communists evolved a new strategy by force of circumstance. Eventually they came under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung who had been removed from the Politburo in the fall of 1927.[1] His policy was designed to build up a series of fluid defensible territorial bases. This task, in turn, involved the civil and military organization of the peasant masses. The Communists under Mao began to profit from certain external conditions that favored them. The National Government, beset with poor communications, inefficiency, warlordism, and then the Japanese, could never muster the final reserve of strength necessary to annihilate its now elusive opponents.

1. According to Mao, this expulsion resulted from his leadership of the unsanctioned "Autumn Crop Uprising" in Hunan.

Chiang K'ai-shek undertook three "bandit suppression" campaigns, each of which was routed. Indeed, the Communist forces waxed stronger after each engagement, so that Mao felt emboldened to announce the establishment of a Chinese Soviet Republic on November 7, 1931 and in December 1931 to convene the first All-China Soviet Congress, from which the so-called Kiangsi Constitution emerged. This fundamental law, while harsh on landlords, permitted considerable deviation from the ideal of "equalitarian distribution" of land. In practice, too, the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic demonstrated its ability to subordinate fixed principles to realities,

On April 26, 1932, the Kiangsi Soviet Republic declared war on Japan, whose forces were beyond its reach. This policy was evidently designed to focus attention on the external threat to China's sovereignty and provide the Communists with an effective propaganda weapon against Chiang Kai-shek, whose troops were still engaged in warfare against the Communist forces. Mao's policy pronouncements of January 10 and April 15, 1933 called for a policy of opposition to Japan and a cessation of fratricidal struggle. They were addressed not to the Kuomintang but to those of its troops who were engaged in battle with the Communists. Mao's status in the formal party organization at this time is not clear, although his counsel carried increasingly greater weight. Apparently he was not in complete control, because the aid of a defecting Kuomintang general, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, was refused by "party dogmatists" in November 1933. The bitter lesson of previous collaboration with Kuomintang elements had left deep scars.

Chiang's reply to Mao's offers was to launch a fourth and fifth extermination campaign. The fifth succeeded finally in dislodging the Communists from their Kiangsi stronghold, and was followed by the "Long March" that brought the Communist government and army to its new base in the barren lands of North Shensi in October 1935. It was in the midst of this trek, at Tsunyi, Kueichou, in January 1935, according to one source, that

Mao's leadership of the party finally became absolute. Also during this march, in August 1935, the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern decided upon its "united front" tactic. Once settled at Yenan, Mao proffered a united front to the detested Kuomintang. While Mao's words failed to achieve the desired response, Chang Hsueh-liang's kidnapping of Chiang K'ai-shek at Sian in December 1936 indirectly secured the joint anti-Japanese front for the Communists. These events brought to an end over nine years of civil war, during which the Chinese Communist Party had turned defeat and adversity skillfully to its purpose.

IV. ANTI-JAPANESE ENTENTE WITH THE KUOMINGTANG (DECEMBER 1936 TO AUGUST 1945)

The Sian affair ushered in another area in the history of the Chinese Communist party. Unity with the Kuomingtang reappeared, but differed in some fundamental respects from the earlier unity. Both political groups now cooperated as mutually exclusive entities with separate armies and mutually exclusive territorial sovereignty. Their suspicion of each other remained ineradicable, and prior Soviet concurrence in the match proved again to be an indispensable prerequisite. The very nature of the entente was symbolic of its loose bonds: it was established by an exchange of declarations between the two capitals, Nanking and Yenan, in September 1937. The new entente rested on Communist concessions that the party had already made to increase its popular support, that were without significance, or that the Comintern had previously sanctioned; and on the National Government's agreement to cooperate with, and assist, the now repentent "bandits" in the common struggle against Japan. Unity of a sort prevailed and certain tangible steps were taken in keeping with the new spirit, but the truce soon became uneasy. Relations deteriorated seriously in July and August of 1938, when three organizations formed by the Communists in Hankow were disbanded by the National Government, and in October 1938, when the national capital moved to Chungking. By the summer of 1939 local battles with Communist troops for control of guerrilla bases had forced the National Government to blockade the

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsai Border Region. The recriminations arising out of the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 ended all semblance of a united front, and thereafter each party frankly concerned itself with the conservation and improvement of its strength for postwar conflict.

In this unspectacular but significant contest, the Communists achieved greater success. While the corruption and inaction of the National Government allowed popular morale to decline in its areas, the Communists exploited the deep popular hatred of the Japanese and mobilized all productive power behind the troops of the Eighth Route Army, whose hit-and run tactics harrassed the Japanese and spread the party's reputation simultaneously. Contacts with the Soviet Union have been reported as insignificant during this period, although Yenan followed closely Moscow's characterization of the world war. Once again, the Chinese Communists had made masterful use of circumstances.

V. RESUMPTION OF CIVIL WAR (AUGUST 1945 TO THE PRESENT)

With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the basis for the Communist-Kuomintang entente disappeared and the Chinese civil war came into the open. Attempts were ma de, principally by the United States, to have the two parties reconcile their differences amicably, but these proved futile. A race to disarm Japanese troops began with, if not before, Japan's capitulation. The occupation of Manchuria was also a rich prize for the first political faction to accomplish the task. Contrary to the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Communist troops received assistance in various forms from the Soviet troops in the Northeast provinces. The Nationalist troops were transported by United States Army planes to Manchuria. Meanwhile, Mao and Chiang, after many promptings and assurances from American officials, met half-heartedly in August 1945 and came to a meaningless agreement in October. A cease-fire agreement was negotiated on January 10, 1946, under the auspices of General Marshall and actually respected for a time; it was followed on February 26 by a Nationalist-Communist agreement

covering reorganization a nd unification of the respective armies. Within a month, however, heated charges of broken promises were again being hurled between the protagonists. On July 21 the National Government launched a campaign against the Communists in North China. On August 14 the Chinese Communist Party ordered a general mobilization. On January 29, 1947, the United States officially abandoned its mediation efforts. General fighting broke out shortly thereafter, with the Communist People's Liberation Army taking the offensive in June 1947 for the first time since the close of the war with Japan. Following their capture of Mukden on October 30, 1948, the Communist armies amassed spectacular victories in rapid succession, entering Tientsin on January 15, 1949, Peip'ing on January 22, Nanking on April 23, and Shanghai on May 25. They are now on the verge of conquering all of South China, and the party will probably announce the creation of a new Chinese government before the year is out.

APPENDIX B

Division of Biographic Information

BIOGRAPHIC NOTES ON SIGNIFICANT COMMUNISTS

Politburo - Chinese Communist Party

CH'EN Yün
CHOU En-lai*
CHU Te*
JEN Pi-shih*
K'ANG Sheng*
KAO Kang*
LIU Shao-ch'i*
LIN Tsu-han*
MAO Tse-tung*
P'ENG Chen*
P'ENG Te-huai*
TUNG Pi-wu*

Central Committee - Chinese Communist Party

CHANG Ting-ch'eng
CHANG Wen-t'ien*
CHANG Yün-i
CH'EN I*
CH'EN Shao-yü
CH'EN T'an-ch'iu
CH'EN Yün
CHENG Wei-san
CHOU En-lai*
CHU Te*
HO Lung
HSU Hsiang-ch'ien
HSÜ T'e-li
JAO Shu-shih
JEN Pi-shih*
K'ANG Sheng*
KAO Kang*
LI Fu-ch'un
LI Hsien-nien
LI Li-san*
LIN Feng
LIN Piao*
LIN Tsu-han*
LIU Po-ch'eng*
LIU Shao-ch'i*
LO Jung-huan
LU Ting-i*
MAO Tse-tung, Chairman*
NIEH Jung-chen*

*Indicates sketches included in this appendix.

P'ENG Chen*
P'ENG Te-hsai*
PO I-po
T'AN Chen-lin
TENG Hsiao-p'ing
T'ENG Tai-yuan
TENG Tzu-hui
TS'AI Ch'ang, Miss*
TSENG Sheng
TUNG Pi-wu*
WU Hsiu-chang
YEH Chien-ying*

Reserve Members, Central Committee

CHANG Chi-ch'un
CHANG Tsung-hsün
CHAO Chen-sheng
CH'EN Keng
CH'EN Po-ta
CH'EN Shao-min
CH'EN Yi
CH'ENG Tzu-hua
HSI Chung-hsun
HSIAO Ching-kuang
HUANG K'o-ch'eng
KU Ta-ts'un
LI Yu
LIAO Ch'eng-chih
LIU Ch'ang-sheng
LIU Hsiao
LIU Lan-t'ao
LIU Tzu-chiu
LO Jui-ching
LU Cheng-ts'ao
MA Ming-fang
SU Yü
SUNG Jen-chiung
T'AN Cheng
TENG Ying-ch'ao (Mme. Chou En-lai)
TSENG Ching-ping
WAN I
WANG Chen
WANG Chia-hsiang
WANG Shou-tao
WANG Tsung-wu
WANG Wei-chou
YÜN Tse

Other Prominent Communists

FENG Wen-pin*
LIU Ning-i*
P'AN Han-nien*

*Indicates sketches included in this appendix.

CHANG Wen-t'ien (alias Lo Fu)

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party. Chang was born in 1898 in Nan-hui, Kiangsu (a suberb of Shanghai) of a wealthy farming family. He attended the Yellow River Conservancy School in Nanking from 1916-19. Leaving school to join the May 4th Movement, he became associated with several publishing houses in Shanghai and with a young group of progressive authors. In 1920 he came to the United States working as a translator for the Ta-tung-pao in San Francisco and studying at the University of California. He taught school in Szechuan in 1923-24 and then returned to Shanghai where he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. Chang was in Moscow from 1926-30 studying at Sun Yat-sen University and later teaching at Lenin University. A close associate of Ch'en Shao-yü, Chang rose to prominence in the Party when Ch'en became the Party's Secretary in 1931. He was at this time elected to both the Central Committee and the Politburo. He was active in the Shanghai section of the Party from 1931-33, serving as Chief of the Department of Organization. In 1933 Chang entered the Chinese Soviet zone in Kiangsi and shortly thereafter became Minister of Propaganda in the Soviet. He was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party during the Long March (probably 1934), a post he probably held until about 1940. Chang, one of the foremost Marxist theorists in the Party, and during the early 1930's the most prolific writer on Party matters, has been unmentioned by Communist sources since late 1946. There are hints that he may have followed Ch'en Shao-yü (relieved of many of his posts in 1943 to 1944) into a position of relative obscurity.

CH'EN I

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; Commander, Third Field Army, Chinese People's Liberation Armies; Mayor of Shanghai. Ch'en was born in 1898 in Szechuan of a landlord family. He studied chemistry at the University of Grenoble, France and was one of the founders along with Chou En-lai, Li Li-san and others of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to China he became a political worker in the forces of the Szechuan warlord Yang Sen. During the period at Chingkanshan, Ch'en headed the Political Department of Chu Te's Army. He did not make the Long March but commanded guerilla troops in South China from 1929 until 1937 at which time his guerilla bands were included in newly-formed New Fourth Army commanded by Yeh T'ing. After the arrest of Yeh T'ing, in 1941, Ch'en assumed the post of acting commander of the New 4th Army and was appointed commander of that army in April 1946, a post he still holds though the New 4th Army has been redesignated several times, most recently being termed the 3rd Field Army. He was elected to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the 7th National Party Congress held in Yenan in April 1945. Ch'en is exclusively a military leader of the Party.

CHOU En-lai

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party.

Chou En-lai was born in 1898 in Huai-yin, Kiangsu of a gentry family. He received his education at Waseda University, Japan; Nankai University, Tientsin and has done additional work at universities in France, Germany, and the USSR. Chou was one of the founders with Li Li-san, Li Wei-han and others of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party and with Chu Te of the Berlin branch of the Party. Returning to China he served as Director of the Political Training Department of the Whampoa Military Academy under Chiang Kai-shek and also served as secretary to General Bleicher, Russian adviser at Whampoa. Chou was appointed by the Communists to head party work in the Kuomintang Armies, 1926. Later assigned to organize workers in Shanghai, he led the uprising on March 21, 1927 which failed when Chiang Kai-shek entered the city. Arrested, Chou escaped and went to Moscow where he studied at the Chungshan University from 1927-30 and during this period served as the Chinese delegate to the 6th Congress of the Comintern. Returning to China in 1931, Chou joined the Kiangsi Soviet as secretary of the Central Communist Bureau. In 1932 he became a political commissar under Chu Te. He participated in the Long March and in 1935 was appointed a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Chou was the chief

Communist representative to the negotiations at Sian during the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, December 1936. He was the chief Communist representative in Nanking and later Chungking, 1937-November 1946 and as such was involved in all negotiations between the Communists and the Central Government. Chou was vice Minister of Political Training of the National Military Council of the Central Government, 1938-40. He returned to Communist territory in November 1946. He headed the Communist delegation at the Peiping negotiations with Nationalist delegates to discuss peace terms in April 1949. Chou En-lai is the Chinese Communist Party's number one man in liaison with the Central Government and with foreigners.

CHU Te

Commander-in-Chief, Chinese People's Liberation Armies; Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. Chu Te was born in 1886 in I-lung Hsien, Szechuan of a peasant family. He received his education at the Yunnan Military Academy and studied in Europe, mostly Berlin, 1922-26. Chu fought with the Nationalist forces in Yunnan and Szechuan from 1911-21. He founded the Berlin branch of the Kuomintang, 1924, having previously established the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Party in collaboration with Chou En-lai. Chu was deported from Germany for subversive activities in 1926 and returned to China via Moscow. In Nanchang in 1927 with other military leaders, Chu led an open revolt against Chiang Kai-shek. Defeated at Nanchang, they attacked Canton and Swatow without success and then retreated through southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. Chu joined forces with Mao Tse-tung at Chingkanshan, on the Kiangsi-Fukien border in May 1928 and was made commander of the 1st Red Army Corps, 1930 and elected Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Armies in 1931, a post he still holds. Chu was named to the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 1934. He was in charge of military tactics on the Long March and arrived in northern Shensi in October 1935. During the period of the United Front with the Kuomintang, Chu served as commander of the 8th Route Army, vice-commander of the 2nd War Zone and a member of the Supreme National Defense Council. Since 1928 Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te have been referred to as the two leaders of the Communist Party, Mao being the political head and Chu the military leader, though he has never been of the stature of Mao. Now somewhat advanced in years, Chu is reported as wielding little power and his position as active Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Armies has been mainly assumed by P'eng Te-huai.

FENG Wen-pin

Leading member of the Central Committee of the China New Democracy Youth Corps; chief of the Young Workers Department of the All-China Federation of Labor.

Born 1911 in Chu-chi Hsien, Chekiang. Received two years of primary school education. In 1919 accompanied his father and sister to Shanghai where they all worked in a match factory. Feng joined the Communist Youth League in 1927 and a year later joined the Chinese Communist Party. After 1927 he worked as an apprentice for a coal company and became active in trade union activities. In 1930 Feng entered the Soviet zone in Fukien and joined the 4th Red Army. By 1933 he was secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Headquarters in Fukien and an active member of the Communist Youth League. Feng made the Long March and on July 30, 1936 was elected the 11th Secretary of the Communist Youth League. There is no indication that Feng does not today hold this same position, although the name of the youth league has undergone several changes, more recently being called the Liberated Areas Youth Federation. He was reported in 1940 and again in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, but was evidently not re-elected to membership in the committee at the 7th National Party Congress in Yenan in April 1945. Although originally active as a labor organizer and once described as a "veteran Marxist labor leader," Feng has spent the past decade and a half as one of the leaders, if not the leader, of Chinese Communist youth organizations.

K'ANG Sheng (alias CHAO Yung)

Member of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Chief of the Political Security Bureau (political police). Chairman of the Shantung People's Government. K'ang Sheng was born in 1899 in Chu-cheng, Shantung of a wealthy landlord family. He attended the University of Shanghai and in 1925 joined the Chinese Communist Party. After the Communist-Kuomintang split in 1927, K'ang was active in underground work in Shanghai. He was elected to membership in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the 6th Party Congress in Moscow in 1928. K'ang may have attended this congress, for although it is not known when he did go to the Soviet Union, he was in Moscow in the early 1930's. Associated with Ch'en Shao-yü, at that time representative of the Chinese Party in Moscow, K'ang was elected an alternate member of the Presidium of the 7th World Congress of the Comintern in 1935 and also a member of the ECCI. He probably returned to China in 1938, perhaps with Ch'en Shao-yu, and was at that time reported as head of the Central Party School in Yenan. K'ang has been a member of the Politburo since at least 1943 and at one time served as Chief of the Department of Organization of the Party. Since at least 1944 he has headed the intelligence and/or political police activities of the Communists. K'ang was reported in Shanghai in 1946 as a liaison officer with Soviet officials. His position within the Party is difficult to assess, for although he at present holds a position of considerable power, he has a record of long association with Ch'en Shao-yü, who was dropped from the inner party councils in either 1943 or 1944.

KAO Kang

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party from a date prior to 1945; Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Communist Party. Born 1902, Shensi Province of a peasant family, Kao Kang, who has had no formal education and has never been abroad, was once a member of the Kuomintang. In 1926 he joined the Chinese Communist Party. Until the end of the Sino-Japanese war, Kao Kang's activities have been entirely carried on in his native Shensi Province. He first became known during a period of famine in Shensi from 1928-1929 when he was actively working in the peasant uprisings there. From 1928 to 1935 his guerilla troops had frequent skirmishes with Nationalist Provincial troops but by the time that the main Communist forces had made the Long March and arrived in Shensi, Kao Kang was head of an already established Shensi Soviet. When this Soviet was dissolved, he became head of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party under whose jurisdiction came Communist bases in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region as well as Communist areas in Shensi and Suiyuan Provinces. During the period when Communist headquarters were at Yenan, Kao Kang held several administrative positions in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government. The 7th Congress of April 1945 reelected him to the Party Central Committee. In 1947 he was transferred to the Northeast where he was the Political Commissioner to the Armies in the Northeast with headquarters somewhere in Manchuria. Since the first of the year most of the prominent Chinese Communist leaders in Manchuria have gone to Peiping and Kao Kang has now become Secretary of the Party's Northeast Bureau. Starting his career as a peasant guerilla leader in his native province, Kao Kang is one of the few prominent Chinese Communists who was not associated with the main corps of the leadership until after their forces reached Yenan. He is today the ranking Chinese Communist in Manchuria.

LI Li-san

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party. Vice Chairman, All China Federation of Labor. Li Li-san was born in 1900 in Hunan of a peasant family. He was educated at the Hunan Provincial First Normal School where other students at that time were Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i and Jen Pi-shih. In 1919 he went to France to study as a member of a "worker-student" group organized by Mao Tse-tung. He was one of the founders with Chou En-lai, Nieh Jung-chen and Li Wei-han of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Expelled from

Franch for activity in a student movement, Li returned to China in 1922 and for the next five years worked in the labor movement then actively being supported by the Chinese Communist Party. Li was the dominant figure in the Party from 1927-30 and is identified with the Party policy of that period which called for mass attacks and insurrection and for control of the main industrial cities. The failure of this plan and the almost complete suppression in the large cities of Communist activities by the Kuomintang evidenced a shift in Party and Comintern tactics and Li, made the scape-goat, went to Russia. For fourteen years he studied and worked in Moscow, returning with Soviet troops to Manchuria in 1945. Li had been elected a member of the Central Committee of the Party (in absentia) at the 7th National Congress in Yenan, April 1945. Until February 1949 Li served in Manchuria as political and/or foreign affairs adviser to General Lin Piao, reported to be an old friend. In the fall of 1948 he was elected Vice Chairman of the All China Federation of Labor and is currently in the Peiping Office of the Federation. A colorful figure of the Chinese Communist movement, there have been many reports of a rift both past and present between Mao Tse-tung and Li. There, however, is no evidence today of differences in the Party High Command. It seems most likely that Li will resume his position as number one labor leader of the Chinese Communist Party labor movement.

LIN Piao

Member, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Commander in Chief of the 4th Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Born 1908 in Hupei Province; father was a small factory owner and the family is said to have been old revolutionaries in the T'ung Meng-hui of Sun Yat-sen. One brother was a veteran party worker in their native Hupei Province. Lin has had all his education in China and graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 during Chou En-lai's tenure at the Academy as Director of Political Training. He joined the Kuomintang in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1925. He fought in Regiments led by Yeh T'ing in 1926 and Chang Fa-kuei in 1927. During the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, Lin's armies defected to the Communists and a year later joined the armies of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te at Chingkanshan in northeast Hunan. A field commander in 1929, he led his armies into Fukien Province where they were fighting for several years. One of the military commanders who supported Li Li-san in the latter's opposition to other Communist leaders prior to 1931, Lin is also reported to have been a firm friend of Li's. He took part in the Long March to Yenan where he was in charge of training military cadets for several years but was critically wounded at some time prior to 1938 when he went to spend three years in the USSR to undergo medical treatment. Lin did not return to an active military command until 1946 when for two years he was in charge of the Manchurian United Democratic Army. It was his armies, apparently under a command in which he could exert considerable independence, which took Manchuria and much of North China for the Communists. Since 1940, Lin Piao has been a member of the Party Central Committee. He is a military commander rather than a political leader but has apparently been able to exercise a certain degree of independence in military decisions. As a military commander and strategist he is one of the ablest among Communist ranks.

LIN Tsu-han (Lin Pai-chu or Lin Po-chu)

Member of the Central Committee (since 1928) and of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Born 1882 in Hunan Province of a landlord, scholar family. Prior to 1911 he studied in Japan where he met Sun Yat-sen and became one of his close friends and associates. After returning from Japan, Lin carried on revolutionary activity for Sun's T'ung Meng-hui in Hunan Province where he helped to overthrow the Manchu regime in 1911. For the next decade, Lin was connected with the government at Peking and he followed Sun Yat-sen to Japan where he took part in the reorganization of the Kuomintang. Lin was thus first associated with the Kuomintang and was a member of its Central Executive Committee in 1924 and 1925. He joined the Communist Party during the early twenties but served in the Canton Government as Chairman of the Finance Committee in 1925. Lin, who was a good friend

of Sun Yat-sen and of Lin Sen, former President of China, is one of the few Chinese Communist leaders who has held positions in coalition government organizations with the Kuomintang. He was one of two Communists to hold a ministerial post in the Wuhan Government in which he was Minister of Finance and was a Communist member of the People's Political Council (PPC), sessions of which he attended from 1939-1941 and again in 1944. After the split between Communists and the Kuomintang (1927) Lin went abroad where he studied in Europe and Russia from 1927-1930. He is reported to have founded a Chinese workers school at Khabarovsk, USSR during this period. In 1930, Lin returned secretly to Shanghai but soon joined Mao Tse-tung's Kiangsi Soviet where he was again in charge of the Finance Department. Lin made the Long March and in December 1936 he was one of the Communist negotiators at the time of the Sian incident, along with the late Po Ku and Chou En-lai with whom he was also associated closely in the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. From 1937 until the recent reshaping of certain Border Region Governments in 1949, he was Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu Ninghsia Border Region Government. In March 1949, Lin was one of the Communist peace negotiators who met with the Nationalists.

LIU Ning-i

Vice Chairman (one of three) and International representative of the All China Federation of Labor and a Vice Chairman of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Liu, who seems to be one of the most important persons in the Chinese Communist labor movement, is one of the few prominent Communist leaders about whom very little is known. He first became active after the death of Teng Fa in April 1946 when he was reported to have attended in Teng Fa's place the Communist-sponsored International Labor Conference held in Moscow in June. In Communist circles in Shanghai it was said that Liu was highly respected by Chinese Communists for his work among the miners. Until that time he had had no experience in dealing with foreigners, and he is not a member of the Central Committee, as are almost all other prominent Chinese Communists. It is probably that he is one of the younger party members who has risen more quickly in the field in which Communist leadership is lacking. The death of Teng Fa put Liu in the first ranks not only in Chinese labor circles but also in the international labor organizations sponsored by the Communists. He has since 1946 been frequently in Europe. In July he and Chu Hsueh-fan attended the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Conference in Prague. On July 7, 1947, Marshal Tito officially received Liu and other Asian delegates in Belgrade. As far as is known Liu is the only ranking Chinese Communist who has visited Jugoslavia. He has attended all European meetings of the WFTU since 1947 and in April was Deputy Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the World Congress of Partisans of Peace, which got only as far as Prague.

LIU Po-ch'eng

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; Commander of the 2nd Field Army; Mayor of Nanking. Born in 1891 in Szechuan Province of a fairly well-to-do family, Liu Po-ch'eng graduated from an army officers school in Chengtu and had his early education in China. One of the Communist leaders who was associated with the 1911 Revolution in military uprisings in his native Szechuan, Liu was a member of the Kuomintang during the early twenties and did not join the Communist Party until 1926. The Wuhan Government appointed him Commander of the 15th Revolutionary Army and his forces took Liuchow in 1926 but he joined the defecting troops who revolted from the Nationalist forces at Nanchang in August 1927. Like several other Chinese Communist leaders, he left China late in 1927 after the failure of Communist attacks on some of the coastal cities. From 1928-1931 he was in Moscow but by April 1931 had become associated with the Communist group in Kiangsi where he was made Chief of Staff to Chu Te and President of the Military Academy. On the Long March, 1934-1935, he and Yeh Chien-ying alternated as Chief of Staff and then as Commander of vanguard troops. Liu, it is said, knew the Lolo language so that he could do useful liaison when the Communists crossed Lolo territory. During the war Liu was Commander in Chief in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan area but his troops fought mainly in Shansi Province. After

the war he continued to command troops in the Shansi-Hopei-Honan area. In March 1949 Liu was Commander in Chief of the Central Plains Liberation Army and since its fall to the Communists he has been made Mayor of Nanking. Liu, who lost an eye in early revolutionary fighting in 1913, has spent almost his entire lifetime in active warfare. The 7th Party Congress of April 1945 appointed him to the Party Central Committee but his career has never been a political one. As a military strategist and commander, his reputation is very high.

LIU Shao-ch'i

Vice Chairman, Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. Born about 1900 in Hunan Province of a peasant family. Studied in China where he attended normal school with Mao Tse-tung and later attended the Far Eastern University, Moscow, 1919-1921. He probably was a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1919. Liu returned to China in 1921 to become associated with the young Chinese labor movement. In the earlier half of the twenties he was closely associated with Mao Tse-tung and more closely with Li Li-san in Party work in labor organization. Liu, who was said to be unable to attend the founders' meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 because he was active in Hunan, is, like Li Li-san, one of the early labor organizers among the Party leadership. He was a delegate to the Labor Congresses of 1922, 1925, 1926 and 1927, during which time he and Li were closely associated and Liu is reported by his own statements to have supported Li's policies when they opposed those of other party leaders in 1930. The 5th National Party Congress of April 1927 elected Liu to the Central Committee, the Committee which several months later ousted Mao Tse-tung from the Politburo. However, Liu joined Mao's Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 and has since that date been a member both of the Party Politburo and Secretariat. During the Long March, 1934-35, Liu was Political Commissioner to P'eng Te-huai's 5th Red Army and subsequently did important undercover work in Peiping from 1935-37. From 1941-43 he served as Political Commissioner of Chen I's New 4th Army but returned to Yenan in 1943. Liu, who was briefly in Manchuria in the late twenties, has for some time been Chief Secretary of the North China Bureau of the Party, but in 1948 was transferred to the same position in the Central China Bureau. He became Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee at the 7th Congress, April 1945 and has frequently since been mentioned as the number two man of the Party, carrying on many active administrative duties for Mao Tse-tung. An important Party theoretician, his speeches have frequently enunciated important party policies.

LU Ting-i

Member, Central Committee and Chief of Propaganda, Chinese Communist Party. Born about 1905 in Kiangsu Province of a well-to-do landlord family. Lu studied engineering at Nanyang University, Shanghai and joined the Communist Party in 1924. His first assignment was in propaganda with the Communist Youth League, a field in which he has now become the number one Communist leader. Lu worked with the Youth League until some time after the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in 1927, then he fled to Moscow. He was a Chinese delegate to the World Communist Youth Meeting, held in Moscow in 1928 but returned to China in 1929 to resume his propaganda work with the Communist Youth League. When the Kiangsi Soviet was established in December 1931, Lu was made head of the Youth League's Propaganda Department. He participated in the Long March, 1934-35, and carried on his propaganda work in the Yenan Soviet, soon becoming head of the so-called Information Department. In 1946 after the death of Po Ku, he became editor in chief of the principal Communist daily, the Chieh Fang Jih Pao. He was elected to the Party Central Committee at the 7th Congress in April 1945. For the first seven months of negotiations between the Kuomintang and Communists in 1926, Lu Ting-i was one of the three chief Communist negotiators. Lu, who has been gaining in stature ever since the establishment of the Yenan Soviet, is today Chief Propaganda Director with an established position as one of the Party's principal publicists and Marxist thinkers.

MAO Tse-tung CHINA

Chairman, Central Committee, Member of the Politburo and Secretariat, Chinese Communist Party; Chairman of the Military Council. Born 1893, Hunan Province of peasant family. Received entire education in China and has probably never been out of the country. Mao is one of the two living founders of the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921. He worked in Peiping after 1919 where he came into contact with Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-ch'ao, two of the Party's founders. In 1924, during the period of Communist-Kuomintang cooperation, Mao was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, a position to which he was re-elected in 1926. In these years he did intensive work among the peasants of Hunan Province and in September 1927 was an organizer of the Hunan peasant uprisings, activity for which he was dismissed from the Politburo and the Central Committee by the faction then in control of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao then retired to Chingkanshan on the Kiangsi-Fukien border, and in November 1927 helped to set up the first Soviet in Tsalin on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. The Soviet lasted only a few months but in May 1928 Mao and Chu Te joined forces at Chingkanshan and Mao became the Political Commissioner of Chu's 4th Red Army. They were the prime movers behind the Kiangsi Soviet, the formation of which was decided in February 1930 and of which Mao became the first Chairman in December 1931. There are indications that he was again briefly ousted from the Party Politburo probably some time in 1931 when conflict existed between the leaders of the Kiangsi Soviet and those party leaders in Shanghai who were close to the Russian representatives of the International. Though Mao was Chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet during its existence from December 1931 to October 1934, he seems not to have become Chairman of the Party Central Committee until some time during or immediately after the conclusion of the Long March at the end of 1935. In July 1935, Mao was elected to the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th Congress and from that time he has undoubtedly been the virtual head of the Party though his appointment as Party Chairman may not have been formalized until the meeting of the 7th Party Congress in April 1945.

NIEH, Jung-chen CHINA

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party and Garrison Commander of Peiping. Born 1899 in Szechuan Province of a well to do landlord family. Nieh, like Chou En-lai, nee. Ts'ai Ch'ang, Chen I and others, studied in France. Nieh was in Europe from 1920-1924, studying chemical engineering in France and Belgium and military science in the USSR. He was one of the founders of the French Branch of the Chinese Communist Party organized in 1921. Upon his return to China sometime in 1925, he was made Secretary of the Political Department of the Whampoa Academy. The Political Department was then headed by Chou En-lai. A member of the Nationalist armies which began the Northern Expedition in 1926, Nieh's armies were part of the defecting troops which revolted against Chaing Kai-shek's armies at Nanchang in August 1927. Here Nieh's troops joined with those of Yeh Ting, Ho Lung and Lin Piao and moved south to set up the Hailofeng Soviet in Kwangtung Province. In December 1927 these troops marched on Canton and following the failure of their attack on the city, Nieh and others fled to the USSR. For the next four years he remained in the USSR, where he was said to have been working with the Comintern. By January 1932 he was back in China working a the Kiangsi Soviets headquarters in Jui-chin where he became Political Commissioner to Lin Piao's armies. Nieh held this position from 1932 to 1936 and like his chief, made the Long March to northwest China, 1934-1935. Subsequently he became the Deputy Commander under Lin Piao of the 115 Division of the 18th Route Army. In 1937 he helped to organize the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government and was made its Chairman. Nieh's headquarters were in the Wu-Tai mountains of Shansi, an area from which he fought guerilla operations throughout the war and from which his troops spread into Manchuria after VJ Day. Nieh's troops held Talgan for a time and after its fall to the Nationalists in September 1946 they returned to Western Hopei from which they contined to operate until

the first of the year. In June 1948, Nieh was made the Commander of the North China People's Liberation Army. In April 1949 he was one of the Communist negotiators appointed to discuss peace terms with the Nationalists. Nieh is one of the top ranking military-political leaders of the Chinese communist party. Until his appointment as Commander of the North China People's Liberation Army he has ranked as a Deputy Commander, but with the spread of Communist into new and wider areas and the recent reorganization of the Communist armies, Nieh takes over command of the Army of North China and comes into the military front ranks. He speaks French very fluently and in past years has been found by westerners to be among the group of Communist leaders who were comparatively easy to work with.

P'AN Han-nien CHINA

Deputy Mayor of Shanghai; member of the South China Bureau of the Party. P'an Han-nien reportedly is a 32 year old native of Kiangsu. He is a graduate of a Communist training school, and by 1945 was head of the Liaison Department of the New 4th Army. At the end of the war P'an became Chairman of the Shanghai Area Political Committee, a post he held until January 1946. He arrived in Hongkong in the late spring of 1948. Although extremely active in the direction of Communist activities and in consulting with leftist political leaders in the colony, P'an has operated secretly and has been unidentified by American and British officials. He advocated the policy of surrounding liberal elements with Communist Party members and of urging these progressives to identify themselves with the Communist Party rather than as representatives of parties allied with the Communists. In this policy he has been most successful. P'an Han-nien seems to be one of the few younger generation Party members who have recently risen to prominence, and, though little known, the success of his work in Hongkong would seem to qualify him for a role in future party leadership.

P'ENG Chen CHINA

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. Secretary of the Peiping Municipal Committee of the Party. P'eng was born in Shansi Province in 1899. He has never been outside China. He joined the Communist Party in 1926 and in his early years of Party membership was active in the organization of trade-unions in North China, though he w s until recently relatively unknown. By 1944 P'eng was Director of the Party School where he impressed a foreign correspondent as one of the important coming men within the Party. This impression has been borne out in as much as P'eng was elected a member of the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Party at the 7th National Party Congress held in Yenan in April 1945. Following the end of the Sino-Japanese War, P'eng went to Manchuria where he was one of the most, if not the most, important and influential party members in the area. He served as Chairman of the Northeast Politburo and as Political Commissar to Lin Piao's forces. P'eng became Secretary of the Peiping Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in February 1949.

P'ENG Te-huai CHINA

Member, Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Armies; Commander, 1st Field Army, Chinese Peoples Liberation Armies. Born in 1900 in Hsiang-tan Hsien, Hunan of a peasant family. He graduated from the Hunan Military Academy and by 1927 had risen to the command of a brigade in the Kuomintang Army of Ho Chien. He broke with the Kuomintang in 1927 and joined the Communist Party. P'eng established a Hunan Soviet Government in 1928 and by 1930 was associated with Chu Te. In 1935 his forces were the vanguard of the Long March to Shensi. P'eng became deputy commander to Chu Te in 1937 and still holds

that position to date. He reportedly has taken over most of the functions of Chu's post. Well regarded as a tactician and military expert, P'eng has not been active on the Party political scene.

TS'AI Ch'ang (Mme. LI Fu-chun) CHINA

Member Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Chairman the All China Federation of Democratic Women; Vice-President (one of four) Executive Committee, International Federation of Democratic Women; Chief, Women's Workers Department, All China Federation of Labor; member of the Secretariat of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace. Born in 1900 in Hunan, several members of Ts'ai Ch'ang's family were prominent early Communists. Her sister-in-law, the head of the Party Women's movement, was executed in 1928 and Ts'ai Ch'ang took over her work. Her sister was executed the same year; her brother, in 1931. Ts'ai Ch'ang went to France with Mao Tse-tung's Worker Study Group in 1919 and was a member of the group of Chinese students which included Chou En-lai, Li Li-san and Ts'ai Ho-sheng (her brother) who founded the French Branch of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923. The same year she married Li Fu-chun, another member of the group. Her husband, who is also on the Party Central Committee, is currently a member of the Northeast Political Council and in intelligence work in Dairen. Mme. Ts'ai Ch'ang, the ranking woman member of the Party, has been closely identified with its work since the early twenties and with the Mao leadership since at least 1937. After her term of study in France she spent the year 1923 in Moscow, then returned to China in 1924 where, like Mao, Lin Tsu-han and others she held positions in the Kuomintang Party during the period 1924-1926. She returned to Moscow in 1928 as a delegate to the meeting of the Comintern held there in July 1928, and remained there until 1932. She made the Long March in 1934 and from 1937 to the end of the Sino-Japanese war headdd the Women's Department of the Party Secretariat. Since the war's end, Mme. Ts'ai Ch'ang has become increasingly active in work in the Women's movement attending the Council of the International Women's Federation in Prague in 1947 and possibly meetings of the Organization in Rome and Budapest in 1948. Mme. Ts'ai Ch'ang is the most prominent of the several prominent Chinese women Communist leaders. In the last two years, through her committee work in Communist sponsored Women's Organizations, she also has become well known in Europe.

TUNG Pi-wu CHINA

Member, Central Committee and the Politburo, Chinese Communist Party; Chairman, North China People's Government. Tung was born in 1887 in Huang-an, Hupei Province of a landlord family. He received his education at the Japanese Law College (1913-15) and at the Lenin Academy, Moscow (1928-32). Tung is one of the two (Mao Tse-tung being the other) present-day Chinese Communist leaders who were founders of the Party in 1921. Active in early Communist Party work, Tung, like Lin Tsu-han, fled to Moscow in 1928 after the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Returning to China in 1932 he joined the Kiangsi Soviet and served for a while as President of the Supreme Court. He was elected to membership in the Party Central Committee in 1934. Tung participated in the Long March and became President of the Party School in Yenan. After the Sian Incident in December 1936, he became one of the Communist representatives to the Central Government, served on the PPC, and during the eight years of the War of Resistance was in Nanking and Chungking almost continually. In 1945 Tung was selected by the Kuomintang as a delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. Although his affect as a member of the Chinese delegation was insignificant, Tung was able to contact other Communist leaders and to present the Chinese Communist cause before various groups of Chinese in the United States. He resumed his position as a Communist representative to the Central Government upon his return to China and participated in the US-sponsored coalition government negotiations in 1946. After the

departure of Chou En-lai for North Shensi in November 1946, Tung remained as chief Communist representative. He in turn was evaucated to Communist territory in March 1947. He then assumed the chairmanship of the China Liberated Areas Relief Association (CLARA) and in September 1948 was selected Chairman of the newly-established North China People's Government. Tung, though a Party veteran, is not considered by most sources to be a top-level Communist leader.

YEH Chien-ying CHINA

Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party. Mayor of Peiping. Born 1903 in Mei Hsien, Kwangtung Province of a merchant family, Yeh received his education at the Yunan Military Academy and from 1928-31 studied at the Red Military Academy in Moscow. Early in his career he was Director of Studies at the Whampoa Military Academy and at one time was confidential secretary to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Yeh joined the Communist Party in 1926 and has since that time served as one of their chief military officials. He participated in the abortive Canton Commune of December 1927, fleeing to Moscow when the rebellion was suppressed. Returning to China in 1931 he became chief-of-staff to Chu Te, a position he held until 1949. Yeh remained in Kiangsi Province during the Long March, later joining the Communist forces in the northwest. He was a member of the Communist delegation in Chungking from 1940-41 and again in 1945-46 was active in negotiations with the Central Government on the issue of a coalition government, serving a chief Communist representative at the Peiping Executive Headquarters. He was appointed Mayor of Peiping immediately after that city's occupation and was for the third time a Communist negotiator when Nationalist delegates went to Peiping in April to duscuss peace terms. Although primarily a military man, Yeh has been used frequently by the Party as a contact man and negotiator.

JEN Pi-shih

Member, Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. Honorary Chairman of the Central Committee of the China New Democracy Youth Corps.

Jen was born in 1899 in Hunan Province of a wealthy farming family. He attended the Hunan Provincial First Normal School in Ch'ang-sha where he was associated with Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i. After further study at Peking University in 1919, Jen went to Moscow where for seven months he studied in the Far Eastern University. Returning to China in 1921 he became one of the founders of the Communist Youth League and served as its secretary about 1925. He was secretary of the Hupei Provincial Party Headquarters from 1929-31, carrying on the Communist program in Hankow under cover of the occupation of a portrait painter. A member of the Central Committee of the Party since at least 1927, Jen was elected to the Politburo in 1931 and has served in that capacity since that time. He was active in the Hunan-Hupei Soviet from 1933-36 serving first as political commissar to Ho Lung's 2nd Front Army and in 1936 becoming head of the Soviet government. At the conclusion of the Long March and the reorganization of the Communist forces following the armistice with the Central Government, Jen became Director of the Political Department of the 8th Route Army Headquarters. He spent 1939-40 in the USSR where he received medical treatment. Returning to China he became head of the Organization Department and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He probably holds neither of these posts at present. Jen was elected Secretary of the 7th National Party Congress held in Yenan in April 1945 and was then reelected to membership on the Central Committee and the Politburo.